China’s Wison New Energies recently announced a sudden halt to their Russian projects, citing strategic concerns for their company’s future. This decision, made in response to US sanctions on Russia’s LNG industry, includes backing out of constructing crucial modules for Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project. This project is pivotal for Russia’s goal to expand its global LNG market share. China’s compliance with US sanctions underscores its complex relationship with the West, navigating between national interests and international pressures. This move not only impacts Russia’s economic plans but also challenges common perceptions about the dynamics between China and Russia.
Following the most recent US sanctions against that nation’s LNG business in mid-June, China’s Wison New Energies said in a LinkedIn post on Friday that they are immediately terminating all of their Russian projects “given the strategic future of the company.” Wison was hired to create the modules for Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, which, according to Oilprice.com, “are massive, prefabricated structures that facilitate the rapid construction of LNG processing plants.” As a result, the project will “deal a blow.”
The Arctic LNG 2 project “has been considered key to Russia’s efforts to boost its global LNG market share from 8% to 20% by 2030-2035,” the presenters further reminded their audience. Russia was forced to accelerate its LNG projects to freely export this resource shortly to make up for tens of billions of dollars in lost revenue as a result of the EU’s “decoupling” from the US-mandated pipeline gas network. Therefore, Wison’s compliance with US sanctions may cause further delays to these objectives.
In late December, RT reported that following the previous wave of US sanctions against the Arctic LNG 2 project—the significance of which was examined here at the time—two significant Chinese energy companies had declared force majeure on their participation in that project. For the convenience of the reader, the conclusion was that China’s national champions are compelled to abide by the unilateral limits of the West to maintain their market share due to the country’s intricate economic interdependence with that bloc.
Although China formally opposes all sanctions imposed outside of the UNSC, it also allows its corporations, including state-owned ones like the ones from RT’s story last December, to choose whether to voluntarily comply with them. The state respects their decision to comply with these regulations because they are meant to serve China’s interests, not Russia’s or anybody else’s, and sometimes that means making difficult choices for the benefit of the country as a whole.
Therefore, neither the Chinese government nor its businesses should be held accountable for willingly adhering to US sanctions; rather, the very fact that this compliance is still taking place should cause members of the Alt-Media Community (AMC) to reassess their inaccurate beliefs regarding the relationship between Russia and China. It is a common misconception among prominent influencers that these two are in complete agreement and are working together to expedite multipolar processes. However, this is untrue.
Even if their strategic alliance has become stronger than before—it might even be said that they have established a Sino-Russo Entente—they continue to differ on topics like Kashmir and the East/South China Sea because Russia fully backs Vietnam’s and India’s respective viewpoints. However, Russia and China handle these differences for the sake of the multipolar world in a responsible manner, just as they should handle Chinese enterprises’ adherence to US sanctions, such as those targeting Arctic LNG 2.
This information is pertinent to the AMC because it’s critical that prominent influencers appropriately disclose these facts in their content to avoid unintentionally misleading their audience about the connections between the two.
Although they are not “against” each other, China and Russia nevertheless put their national interests first. They may vary and result in developments like Chinese enterprises complying with US sanctions, but they generally overlap when it comes to working together to achieve their common aims.
Regarding this most recent instance, it will impede Russia’s ambitious plans for LNG and hence run the risk of reducing its future revenue flows. It may also have an impact on the two countries’ ongoing negotiations over the Power of Siberia II pipeline, which has reached a standstill. Russia may, in financial desperation, give in to China’s allegedly demanded basement-bottom prices, or it may refuse out of bitterness, leaving this project in limbo/until China eventually changes its mind.
The second possibility, in which China consents to pay higher but still preferential prices for Russian gas, might come to pass if the US puts more pressure on it shortly, as is anticipated in the wake of the mutual defense agreement between North Korea and Russia. In summary, the US will probably take advantage of this new agreement between the two countries to increase its military presence in the region at the expense of China’s legitimate national security interests. The preceding hyperlinked analysis goes into further depth on these dynamics.
In that case, China may change its mind and accept Russia’s pipeline terms if the aforementioned trend continues concurrently with the US increasing pressure on Beijing in the East and South China Seas in ways that suggest a credible intent to halt its energy shipments in an emergency. Getting dependable gas from its neighbor would be well worth the extra cost, as opposed to waiting for a better deal and running the danger of the US stopping its LNG shipments while it waited.
Going back to the lead, Wison’s adherence to US sanctions against Russia ought to cause the AMC to at last rectify its inaccurate impressions of the Sino-Russo Entente. It may also have an impact on how the Power of Siberia II pricing conundrum is settled, as previously mentioned. The fact that it would also impede Russia’s ambitious LNG plans—which are anticipated to generate a significant portion of its future revenue—makes the company’s choice far more consequential than most may have realized.
Last year, GreatGameIndia reported that Russia will begin year-round LNG shipments via the Arctic route of the NSR, a transit route spanning the entire length of Russia’s Far East and Arctic territories within its exclusive economic zone.
