This report reveals Azerbaijan’s unique stance amidst global criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza, contrasting with other Muslim-majority nations. Despite recognizing Palestine and advocating for a two-state solution, Azerbaijan maintains a notably muted response to the Gaza conflict, avoiding public criticism of Israel. This stance is rooted in Azerbaijan’s strategic alliance with Israel, driven by shared geopolitical interests and historical ties. Israel supports Azerbaijan with crucial military aid, including during its recent conflict with Armenia, which is aligned with Iran, Azerbaijan’s regional rival. This quiet partnership with Israel allows Azerbaijan to navigate complex regional dynamics while advancing its own strategic goals.

While several Muslim-majority countries have condemned Israel for its actions in Gaza, Azerbaijan stands out for its relative calm.

Baku, which will shortly draw greater global notice as it prepares to host Cop29 in November, has historically had stronger ties with Israel than many of its neighbors. In recent years, their friendship has become stronger.

Israel is now Azerbaijan’s main crude oil destination, and Israel supplied critical weapons for Baku’s triumph in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.

However, relationships are motivated by more than just cash rewards, with shared geopolitical worries, particularly surrounding Iran, further fueling the relationship.

Israel refers to Azerbaijan as a “strategic partner” with whom it has long had close connections. When Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991, Israel was one of the first to recognize the new state. A small Jewish population in Azerbaijan, numbering between 7,000 and 16,000 persons, provides a cultural tie, but the political relationship has been prioritized.

Benjamin Netanyahu became the first Israeli prime minister to visit Azerbaijan in 1997, and since then, trade and security cooperation has grown. By the mid-2000s, Azerbaijan had become Israel’s fifth-largest economic partner, with oil bound for the eastern Mediterranean and weapons and other military supplies bound for the Caspian Sea.

Today, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan supply 60 percent of Israel’s crude oil.

No criticism of Israel

Israel believes that having a Muslim-majority state as a partner will help to minimize its diplomatic isolation in the Muslim world. This has been especially noticeable since the Gaza conflict began.

While most Muslim-majority countries have been outspoken in their condemnation, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s government has been unusually quiet. Aliyev met Israeli President Isaac Herzog on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference in February, and there has been little public outcry against Israel since the Gaza war began.

Rovshan Mammadli, a journalist and commentator living in Baku, even cites a “de facto ban on protests against Israel” by Aliyev’s dictatorial administration.

Baku is concerned about the Palestinian people’s suffering. It recognizes Palestine and has a Palestinian embassy. It has been a staunch backer of the two-state solution and has backed UN cease-fire resolutions since the war began.

However, Baku’s stance has been carefully balanced, expressing support for Palestinians while not harshly criticizing Israel.

For Baku, Gaza pales in comparison to more pressing issues, for which Israel has proven an effective ally.

The first is a war with neighboring Armenia. Since providing Baku with vital weapons to defeat Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Israel has strengthened its military alliance with Azerbaijan. Intelligence sharing between the two countries has improved, and Israel has contributed to advanced drone technology. Israeli businesses have also hastened to invest in rebuilding Nagorno-Karabakh.

Israel’s support for the 2020 conflict was linked to Azerbaijan’s second major concern: its southern neighbor, Iran.

Tehran supported Armenia in its decades-long battle with Azerbaijan, even though it is a Christian-majority country fighting another Muslim-majority country. This has led to strained relations between Tehran and Baku, and it helps to explain why Aliyev has been eager to strengthen ties with Iran’s long-standing adversary, Israel.

The mutual antagonism has also resulted in Iran supporting Islamist parties in Azerbaijan and Baku encouraging Iranian Azeris to seek independence, with limited success.

Similarly to its secret assistance for some Kurdish parties in Iraq, Israel recognizes the importance of having strong anti-Tehran forces on Iran’s border.

‘New chapter’

Nonetheless, Armenia’s setbacks in 2020 and the collapse of Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 have altered Tehran’s calculations slightly. Immediately following the conflict, it mobilized troops along the Caucasus border to prevent Azerbaijan from advancing deeper into Armenia to unite with its non-contiguous province, Nakhchivan.

Since then, Tehran has used less confrontational tactics, reaching an agreement last year to allow Azerbaijan access to Nakhchivan via Iranian territory, to temper its ambitions to take Armenia’s “Zangezur Corridor”.

They have also backed the prospect of a new train link connecting Russia and India via Iranian and Azeri territory, with authorities referring to a “new chapter” in Baku-Tehran relations.

This may not resolve decades of hostilities between the two neighbors, nor will it force Baku to cut ties with Israel. Tehran may hope that if Baku feels less threatened by Iran, it may reduce its ties with Israel over time.

A more imminent cause of strain on Israeli-Azeri relations is Turkey. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s closest ally by far, surpassing Israel. Aliyev’s father and predecessor as president even described their relationship with their Turkic counterparts as “one nation, two states”.

In 2020, Ankara contributed significant weapons, albeit in smaller quantities than Israel, as well as military training for Azerbaijan and Syrian militiamen to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh. Unlike Aliyev, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been openly critical of Israel since the beginning of the Gaza conflict. Israel and Turkey have recalled their diplomats, and Erdogan has terminated several commercial agreements.

According to Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, Erdogan’s rage at Israel may eventually “doom” Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, with the Turkish president demanding a stronger response from its partner on Gaza.

While this is a possibility given Ankara’s importance to Baku, Israeli-Azeri relations are now deep and historical, and Azerbaijan would be unwilling to abandon them, even under Turkish pressure.

Baku will most likely hope that a truce is announced before any such pressure from Ankara emerges, allowing it to maintain its tight, discreet ties with Israel while facing less attention.

Recently, GreatGameIndia reported that in a tragic incident, an Israeli airstrike hit near the main gate of the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency headquarters in Gaza City, killing at least eight people and injuring many others who were seeking aid or sheltering from the conflict.